Quantification of Containment Measures Used in Safeguards by Avenhaus, R. et al.
Juni 1973
Projekt Spaltstofffiußkontrolie
Quantificatioi'l 01 COliltainment MeaslJl'es
Used in Safeguards






QUANTIFICATION OF CONTAINMENT MEASURES
USED IN SAFEGUARDS
R. Avenhaus, L. Grünbaum, D. Nentwich
Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH., Karlsruhe
Institut für
Angewandte Systemtechnik und Reaktorphysik

Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird der Versuch gemacht, den Einfluß von Maßnahmen
der dichten Umhüllung (containment) im Rahmen von allgemeinen Ober-
wachungsmaßnahmen quantitativ zu formulieren, sowie die optimale
Kombination von Maßnahmen der Materialbilanz und der dichten Um-
hüllung herauszufinden o
In einem ersten Teil wird in allgemeiner Form erklärt, was unter dem
Begriff 'Quantifizierung ' zu verstehen isto Es werden Kriterien ent-
wickelt, und es wird der Nutzen der Maßnahmen der dichten Umhülluna
bezüglich dieser Kriterien diskutierto Als Anwendungsbeispiel wird"das
Absender-Empfänger-Problem detailliert behandelt.
Im zweiten Teil wird das Problem der überwachung eines Plutonium-Lagers
mit Hilfe eines allgemeinen, früher entwickelten spieltheoretischen Mo-
delles quantitativ analysiert. Es wird eine Kostenoptimierung bei fest
vorgegebener Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit als Randbedingungdurchge-
führt, die Variablen sind die Zahl der Inspektionen pro Jahr und die Zahl
der Siegel, die pro Inspektion zu prüfen sindo Die Ergebnisse, die von
d~n v~rschieqenenModellparametern wie Güte und Kosten der Siegel, In-
spektor-Manntage-Kosten etco abhängen, werden diskutierto
Im letzten Teil werden mögliche Modellerweiterungen, praktische Anwendungen
sowie Experimente auf diesem Gebiet angesprochen o
Abstract
In this paper an attempt has been made to formulate quantitatively the effect
of containment measures in the framework of a general safeguards system and
furthermore, to find out an optimal combination of containment and material
accountancy measures o
In a first part it is explained in general terms what is meant by 'quantifi-
cation ' o Criteria are developed, the usefulness of containment measures with
respect to these criteria is discussedo As an application the shipper receiver
problem is considered in some detail o
In the second part the problem of safeguarding a Plutonium storage is analyzed
quantitatively with the help of a general game theoretical model developed
earliero A cost optimization with a fixed probability of detection as a boun-
dary condition is carried through o Here, the variables are the number of in-
spections per year and the number of seals to be identified per inspection.
The results which depend on several parameters of the model, eo9o quality
and costs of seals, inspection manday costs, are discussedo
In the conclusion, possible further extensions, practical applications and
experimental tests in this field are consideredo
Manuskript zum Druck einger. 10.5.1973
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1. Introduction
It is now a generally accepted fact that a safeguards system can be
based on the three basic measures material accountancy, containment
and surveillance /1,2, 3, 4/. The first of these has been recognized
to be a measure of fundamental importance with containment and surveil-
lance as important complementary measures. As opposed to material ac-
countancy, the other two measures are generally considered to be quali-
tative in nature /5/. They can normally be used to prevent a diversion or
indicate actions which may lead to the detection of a diversion, but sel-
dom to indicate the actual amount diverted. Measures based on material
accountancy on the other hand, enable a safeguards organisation to estab-
lish the result of a diversion, namely, the amount, in a direct and quan-
titative manner.
The important role played by the containment measures has been recognized
at an early stage /6/ and their implications have been analysed in some
detail for a number of cases /3, 7/. Such measures, particularly the use
of seals for containers storing nuclear materials, have been shown to cause
a significant reduction in safeguards efforts /8/. Some work has also been
reported on the categorization and development of the different qualitative
measures /5, 9, 10/. However, no effort appears to have been spent on a
possible quantification of containment measures.
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The present paper discusses the possibility of aquantification af same
of the characteristics of containment measures namely, the use ofseals•.
The paper has been divided broadly into two parts. In the first part,
it is discussed in general terms what is meant by Iquantification of
safeguards measures I furthermore, the types of contai nment measures con-
sidered and their usefulness with respect to the different relevant safe-
guards parameters is described. In a specific example, the safeguards region
exit reprocessing plant to entrance fabrication in a nuc1ear fuel cycle
the use of seals is considered as a complementary measure to material ac-
countancy. In the second part, the application of containment measures in
a sealed Plutonium storage facility has been considered in a quantitative
manner on the basis of a general game theoretical model developed earlier.
In this model the containment measuresapplied have been considered to be
the only safeguards measure. The paper ends with a summary of the main re-
sults obtained and some general conclusions.
2. Analysis of Possibilities of Quantification of Containment Measures
2.1 Categorization of Containment Measures
In this paper, a containment measure is understood to consist of two parts:
- a device or system which enclosesnuclear material or information
to oe safeguarded against diversion or falsification
- a device or system which allows to recognize any attempted intrusion.
A categorization of the different containment measures in question has been
given in Ref. 1101. According to this categorization one has
- containment measures which enclose nuclear material and information
as well as those persons who are in the position to divert material
(fences, walls etc.)
- containment measures which enclose only nuclearmaterial and information
(sealed containers, lines etc.).
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Additionally, one can categorize the containment measures according to whether
they permit an immediate recognition of an attempted intrusion (alarm systems)
or not, i.e. they permit such a recognition only with a certain delay of time
(e.g. seals which are controlled periodically). It is the latter category
which is to be discussed here.
2.2 Basic Considerations
2.2.1 Objective of Safeguards
Since the term 'quantification of a safeguards measure' may be interpreted
in several ways, it is necessary to clarify the use of this term in the
context of the present paper.
The objective of safeguards as specified in Ref. /4/ is 'the timely detection
of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material •••• I.
The usefulness of a safeguards measure can be assessed by the extent to
which it enables a safeguards organization to attain this objective in as
unequivocal a manner as possible, namely, whenever possible, by a set of
numbers. It is to be noted that basicaily two elements are involved in the
safeguards objective: the time and the amount of material.
2.2.2 Amount of Material
For material accountancy measures an idea on the amount of material in the
case of a diversion, can be obtained in the following way: As long as no
physical inventory has been taken the amount Massumed to be diverted may be
at maximum the book inventory BI:
o < M< BI
(In reality the upper limit for Mwill be much smaller for plant operation
reasons.) After a physical inventory taking and the establishment of a
material balance over a given period of time in a facility the amount M
assumed to be diverted can be estimated by the difference between the book
inventory and the physical inventory. However, so long as the material
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balance in a facility is established with the help of measured values which
are associated with measurement errors and so long as process losses. and
other factors influencing the material balance /11/ are subject to random
variations, the amount of diversion estimated with the h~lp of the difference
between the book and the physical inventory, can not be known with certainty.
Therefore, any statement on a diversion based on material accountancy measures
can only be of a probabilistic nature associated with the statistical errors
of the first kind a (false alarm rate) and of the second kind ß (one minus
the probability of detection). In the case of a confidence interval statement
on the diverted amount M one obtains thus, a statementof the following form
BI - PI - X(a) ~ M~ BI - PI + X(a)
Considering a contatnment which serves to safeguard the amount I of material,
one can state that no material has been diverted, so long as the containment
is intact. In case of a broken containment (e.g. a birdcage with a manipulat-
ed seal) the statement on the amount Mof material assumed to be diverted
will be
O<M<I.
2.2.3 Oetection Time and Critical Time
The element of 'time' can be associated with the 'detection time'(TO) for a
diversion. For material accountancy measures, the time between two conse-
cutive physical inventory takings is an upper limit for the detection time.
Ouring the early days of investigation on a safeguards system in conformity
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty /12/, the concept of 'critical time' (TC)
was introduced. This time was taken to be the time required to transform
diverted material into a useable military device. TC was taken to be related
to the 'accessibility' of nuclear material and was assumed to vary between
about a week for Plutonium and highly enriched Uranium and a few months for
low enriched Uranium and irradiated materials. From the point of view of
safeguards the detection time TO has to be set into relation with the critical
time TC since TC together with the amount Mof diversion reflects the hazard
in the sense of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty. However, if just for arguments
sake and as an extreme case TO=TC' for the material accountancy measures
it would imply the taking of physical inventories eVery week in a fabrication
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plant for Plutonium or highly enriched Uranium and in a reprocessing plant.
Since physical inventory taking in such plants is normally manpower inten-
sive and highly intrusive it was recognized at an early date that such fre-
quent inventory taking for safeguards purposes would not be feasible in
practice. As a working hypothesis the frequency of physical inventory
taking for such plants was assumed to synchronize with those taken by the
plant operators /13/, namely once or twice a year. Thus,one obtains detection
times TD in the region of six to twelve months although the critical times
TC are assumed to be much shorter as mentioned earlier. The facit assumption
behind this procedure is that between two inventories the materials in such
plants are made 'inaccessible' through suitable containment orsurveillance
measures.
2.2.4 Safeguards Costs
On the basis of the foregoing discussions quantification of a particular
safeguards measure may be taken to be an effort to express the results of that
measure in terms of the relevant parameters, time and amount, with a set of
numbers. Since a safeguards system has always to be as economic as practicable
the costs Kfor carrying out a given safeguards measure have to be taken up
along with the other parameters.
Note: In addition to the safeguards parameters discussed up to now
often the tamperresistance of a specific measure is mentioned. In fact,
it is obvious that material accountancy statements are only valid if
the data processed and reported by the operator are not falsified.
Therefore, one has to guarantee that no data falsification is possible
or one has to take into account explicitly diversion strategies on the
basis of data falsification (see, e.g. Ref. /16/).
The concept of tamperresistance plays only a major role in case the in-
spection authority has to rely to a large degree on stored data, but in
principle no safeguards measure can be fully tamperproof if the effort spent
is limited; the possibility of a successful falsification must be taken into
account. However, as can be concluded from the discussion up to now,
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tamperresistance can be expressed by the terms probability of detection
and costs (the higher the costs or the effort in general, thehigher
the probability of detection, i.e. the higher the tamperresistance).
Therefore, tamperres i stance will not be cons i dered here as an independent
safeguards parameter.
2.2.5 Conclusion
Conc1uding this general discussion, and in conformity with the investigations
in the case of material accountancy/14, 15/, one may state that quantifi-
cation of safeguards measures means the establishment of quantitative re-
1ati ons between thefo11 owi n9 parameters
- The.amount assurned to be diverted
- The probability of detection
- The error of the first kind
- The detection time
M
P = 1-e
It is to be noted that the error of thefirst kind a (the probability
of comitting a false alarm) is quantitatively different fram the other para-
meters (it cou1d be treated as a determinant /16/). Since in the models con-
sidered in the following this error appears to be extrernely low, this para-
meter has not been considered in the rest of this paper.
2.4 Specific Example
In this section an example for a containment measure which supports the material
accountancy shall be ana1yzed. With the hell' of this examp1e it shall be
il1ustrated in which way the considerations given above can be applied in
a semi-quantitative manner.
2.4.1 Formulation of the Problem
Let A be the product station of a reprocessing plant where from the time-
point t o on Plutonium-nitrate is bottled from a storage tank and furthermore,
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let B be the input station of a fabrication plant where the bottles arrive
from the timepoint t l on (more generally t 1 is the timepoint from which on
the operator of B takes the responsibility for the material) and where the
Plutonium-nitrate is processed fromthe timepoint t 2 on.
It is assumed that the operator A (shipper) as well as the operator B (re-
ceiver) determine the Plutonium eontent of eaeh bottle quantitatively by
determining
(i) the net weight of eaeh bottle and
(ii) the chemieal eomposition of the eontent of each bottle.
Let Tl: = tl-to be the time interval between the measurement at A and the
arrival at B, let furthermore T2: = t 2-tl be the time interval between the
arrival at Band the measurement at B, let T: = t2-to = Tl+T2 be the total
time interval between the measurements of a single bottle at A and B.
It is assumed that the inspector who has to safeguard this proeedure in ease
there is no limitation in the effort available proceeds as follows:
(1) Checking of the operator's data at A by means of independent measurements
(2) Sealing of the bottles at A after operator's,measurements and identi-
fication of the seals before the measurements at B
(3) Checking of the operatoris data at B by means of independent
measurements.
Additionally, the inspector compares all the data available.
These safeguards measures represent counter-strategies against the follow-
ing possible diversion strategies (here, one has to make a difference whether
the operators A and B cooperate for the purpose of diversion or not):
(1) Falsification of data at A
(2) Diversion of material after the measurement at A, before t l
(3) Diversion of material after t l , before the measurement at B
(4) Falsification of data at B.
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All the (pure) strategies considered here are 1isted in lab1e 1. It is
to be noted that on1y strategies of data falsifications are taken into
account - the possibi1ity that the operators divert ~ateria1 within the
limits of the material balance isexc1uded as the relevant amounts of
material are assumed to be too sma11.
Theprob1em now is to determine for a finite effort avai1ab1e the optimal
combination of measurements and sealing and identification measures.
Here, the criteria for optimization are functions of
- the detection time
- the probability of detection as a function of the amount assumed to be
diverted.
Contrary to normal optimizati.on procedures the criterion for optimization is
not a skalar but a vector with two components. The question whether it is
possib1e to project this vector to a sca1ar by rneans of an appropriateuti1ity
funeti on or not shall not be discussed here.
2.4.2 Game Theoretical Analysis of th;s Problemfor Specific Assumptions
The case is considered now that both 'p1ayers', inspector and operators,
choose on1y one of the strategies 1isted above. A two-person zero-sum
game is considered now inwhich the payoff to the operator is a vector the
two components ofwhich are the negative probability of detection and the
detection time.
Note: With respect to the probability of detection a justification for
this procedure has been given already earlier 117/. If one assumes further-
more, that the gain (in any uti1ity units) of the operators is proporti.onal
to the detection time then in a way ana10geous to tnat detai1ed in 117/ one
can take the critica1 time itself as payoff so 10ng as one..is interested
main1y in the optimal strategies.
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The conflict situation described<above can therefore, be represented by
a 'payoff-matrix' given in Table 2.
It is to be seen from the matrix that the general case that both operators
act illegal is worse from the inspector's point of view (the modifications
of cases 1.1-1 and 1.4-3 are not considered to be important in this connection).
Therefore, only this general case is considered in the following. Additional-
ly, one sees that strategy 2.3 of the operators is worse than strategy 2.2
from the point of view of the operators thus, it is neglected.
Note: As one can take from Table 2, strategy 1 of the inspector (which
in many cases is normal practice today) is not necessarily the best strategy
in the framework of these considerations.
2.4.3 Analysis of the Effect of the Sealing Procedure
In order to be able to analyze the value of the sealing procedure it is
assumed that for the total safeguards procedure the effort C is available.
The two following cases are considered now.
Case I: The inspector checks the data at A and B with the helpof independent
measurements; this leads to a probability of detection PC{M) in case an
amount Mof nuclear material is diverted.
Case 11: The inspector checks the data at A and Bwith the help of inde-
pendent measurements and seals and identifies all containers; as for the latter
procedure a certain effort is necessary the probability of detection with,.,
respect to the data falsification strategy will be PC{M) < PC{M).
Thus, from the payoff matrix given in Table 2 one deduces a payoffmatrix
given in Table 3.
As the operators strategies 2.1 and 2.4 are equivalent only the first one
will be taken into account in the following. Qualitatively one can draw
the following two conclusions from Table 3:
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(i) If the sealing procedure is very cheap compared to the checking of-measurements, PC(M) will not be significantlysmaller than PC(M)
thus, strategy 11 is better from the operator's point of view.
(ii) If the sealing procedure is very expensive the inspector will choose
strategy case I as on the average he comes out with a higher proba-
bility of detection (with respect to the critical times there is
no difference between the two strategies of the inspector).
For the quantitative analysis it is useful to consider separately the game
the payoff of which is given by the first component of the payoff vector
('P-game',Table 4a) and thereafter the game the payoff of which is given
by the detection time (T-game).
In theP-game strategy 2.1 of the operators dOminates strategy 2.2. If one
considers the game thus reduced one sees that strategy (1+3) of the inspector
dominates strategy (1+2+3). Therefore, the strategies 2.1 and (1+3) are optimal
for the twoplayers.
In the .-game strategy 2.2 of the operators dominates strategy 2.1. After
the appropriate reduction one sees that the two inspector strategies are
equivalent. The inspector however, will choose strategy (1+2+3) as that
strategy guarantees a better probability of detection.
One sees that the result of the optimization changes completely if one
changes the criteria for optimization. As has been mentioned already earlier
it would be necessary to construct an appropriate scalar utility function
from the two payoff-functions if one would be obliged to give a unique solution
of the problem.
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3. Analysis of the Problem of Safeguarding a Plutonium-Storage byMeans
of Sealing and Identification Measures
3.1 Formulation of the Problem, Strategies, Costs
A Plutonium storage is considered in which Plutonium is stored during a
reference time interval CO, T). It is assumed that the Plutonium is con-
tained in n2 birdcages and that these n2 birdcages arestored in n1 con-
tainers o All the birdcages as well as the containers are sealed with seals
of the same type. The probability to identify a falsified seal is given by
n1• (It is assumed in this context that this probability is independent of
the time the operator spends for the falsification of the seal.)
The inspector visits the storage on the average J times during the reference
time interval. The safeguards procedure during a visit consists in the iden-
tification and changing of all the container seals and in the identification
and changing of a representative sample of k birdcage seals. It is to be
noted that this safeguards procedure primarily leads to the detection of a
falsification of seals, not to the detection of a diversion of material. There-
fore, in the following the amount Mof material assumed to be diverted does
not occur. This procedure has to be understood in such away that the detection
of a falsification will lead to a physical inventory and thus, to the detection
of a diversion of material. However, this problem of second action levels will
not be detailed in this paper.
The problem treated hereI) is the establishment of quantitative relations between
the relevant parameters. Specifically it consists in the determination of the
necessary number of inspections per year as well as the necessary sample size
k of seal identifications per visit for a given overall probability of detection.
This means that contrary to the considerations in the foregoing example the
detection time is a determinant, not a criterion of optimization.
The time schedule for an operator who has the intention to divert material
from the storage is as follows:
l)Preliminary results are already given in Ref. /18/.
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Taking of the characteristics of thecontainer seal
Production of two copies of the container seal in
question (Tl = tl-to)
Opening of the container seal: taking of the characteristics
of the birdcage seal, replacement of the original container
seal by the copy produced before
Production of a copy of the birdcage seal (T2 = t2-tl )
Diversion of the Plutonium ofthe birdcage in question,
replacing of the birdcage and container seals by the copies
produced before
Time necessary inorrler to use the Plutonium diverted in an
appropr1ate way (T3 = t 3-t2).
As a consequence, the following situations result for the inspector:
Visit during
The inspector states no diversion however, he changes the con-
tainer seal. This means that the time spent by the operator
for the production of a copyof the container .seal has been
spent in vain.
The inspector states with probability TII a falsification of the
container seal however, no diversion has yet been taken place.
The inspector states with probability TI l a falsification of
the container seal and with probability ~ • TIl a falsification
of the birdcage seal in case the falsification of the container
seal has not been recognized.
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If the Plutonium has already been diverted and the falsification of the
container seal is detected then the diversion of the Plutonium will be
detected in any case as then all the birdcages are controlled. Therefore,
the probability TI that a diversion is detected in case the inspector comes
in the time period (t2,t3) is
( 1)
It is to be noted that in the framework of this model the critical time for
the operator is '1+'2+T3 whereas the critical time T from the point of view
of the inspector is , = T2+T 3• The average detection time is ~.
Generally it is assumed that the operator has the gain + d if the diversion
i s not d~tected during the cri ti ca1 timeT!). Wi th~espect to the loss of the
operator in case of a timely detection ofthe diversion two different cases
have to be considered
(t) In case of an inspection during (to,t1) the operator has only a
small loss which consists in the equivalent of the time spent up
to the inspection for the production of the copies of the container
seal.
(ii) In case of an inspection during (tl't3) and detection the operator
has the large loss C. It is assumed that from the point of view of
the operator it is equally damaging whether the detection of the falsi-
fication takes place in the time interval (t1,t2) or in (t2,t3).
Note: In the case TI l =1 there is no advantage for the operator to
falsify the seals according to a time schedule described above as a
falsification will be detected in any case if the falsified seal is
l)In any case the diversion is detected after the reference time T if the
material is to be used again and the receiver of the material does not
collaborate with the operator of the storage however, this detection is
considered here to be too late.
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eheeked. Therefore t in this ease the operator ean follow only a
simple time sehedule:
Diversion of Plutonium t replaeement of the original
seals by roughly falsified seals (in order that it
eannot be seen at the first sight that something is
wrong) •
Time necessary for the use of the Plutonium diverted
(T = tl-to).
In this ease the payoff to the operator is the same as that in the
ease Il1 <1 with the exception that it refers to a shorter eritical
time.
The total costs K of the inspecttQn in the reference interval of time consist
of
Costs K1 for seals
Costs K2 for the inspector.
In total n1+k seals are replaced during one inspection. Let b be the costs
per birdcage seal and b' be the costs per container seal. (It is assumed
that the costs of container and birdcage seals may be different because
of different modes of fixing even in case the seals have the same quality
expressed by IT1). Then one obtains
(2a)
The tosts for one inspection consist of the travelling time (2 days per in-
spection) and time for identification and replacement of seals (time necessary
per seal x inspector mandays). Let e be the costs per inspector manday. Then
one has
(2b)
Thus t the total safeguards costs per reference time are
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(3)
One can conceive a different cost model where the time necessary for one
inspection is independent of the number of seals checked during the in-
spection. In this case one would get instead of (3)
(3' )
where c are the costs for one inspector's visit plus identification of
the seals checked.
3.2 Game Theoretical Model; Mathematical Formulation of the
OptiliiiZatiol'l Problem
The problemformulated above can be analyzed with the help of agame theore-
tical model developed earlier /19/; it describes in general terms situations
like that formulated in the preceding section. According to this model the
probabilityp to detect timely a falsification during the reference time
T is given by
~ Tl·np = I-(I-n) • (1--)
9 (4a)
Here, n is given by eq. (I), g is the greatest integer smaller than T-I,
T
T is the critical time, the integers ~ and Tl are defined by the division
of J with respect to the integer g:
J = ~'g+Tl
(4b)
For the sake of clarity the three different probabilities of detection
occuring in the framework of this theory are collected once more: p has been
defined above, n is the probability to detect a falsification of a seal
during a visit and nI is the probability to identify a falsified seal as a
falsified seal.
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The analysis of the problem of safeguarding a plutonium storage bymeans
of sealing and identification therefore, according to the considerations
of the foregoi ng section results in the determinati on of the va] ues of J
and k and can be formulated in the following way:
The total costs K have to be minimizedw;th respect to the variables
J and k under the boundary condition of a fixed total probability p
of detection.
It has to be noted that the boundary condition that a given probability of
detection has to be guaranteed could be changed into an equivalent boundary
condition that the operator has to be induced to act legally (see Ref. /17/).
The boundary condition used here has the advantage that the payoff parameters
do not occur explicitly.
3.3 Discussionof the Probabiltty' cf Detection
In this section the probability of detection p, eq. (4), is discussed as
it constitutes the most important boundary condition for the cost optimization.
For this purpose eq. (4) is written in the fol1owing form
J . Tl-=f;+-9 . . 9
o < !l < 1-g





Here, n is the probability of detection for a single inspection in case this in-
soection falls into the critical time after the diversion, defined byeq, (1),
and 9 is the greatest integer smal1er than T~l,i .e. the maximum number of
r
critical time intervals r during the reference time interval T.
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It is the aim of this section to study the interdependence of J and
for a given total probability of detection p. For this purpose three
different cases are considered:
(i) 1;=0
In this case one obtains from eq. (5b)
{=!l<1
9 9
and therefore from eq. (5a)
(6a)
p = JlI·-g (6b)
This means that in this case the average time interval between
two inspections may be smaller than the critical time; the ratio
of these two time intervals is determined by p and II (eq. 6b).
(ii) 1;=1
In this case one obtains from eq. (5b)
~ = 1 + !l
9 g
and therefore, from eq. (5a)
J1-p = (l-lI)·(l-lI (- - 1»
g






This result can be interpreted in the following way:
In case the probability II of detection for a single inspection is
smaller (greater) than the postulated overall probability p of
detection, the average time interval between two inspections has
to be greater (smaller) than the critical time.
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It is to be noted that the function i (rr) with p as a parameter isnot
9 .




As one sees the relative difference between the two derivations becomes
small if p goes to zero.
(iii) ~22
In this case one obtains from eq. (5b)
i =!:"+!l.., !:" 239 '" 9 ",=, , •••
and therefore, from eq. (5a)
(ga)
~ J1-P = (1-11) • (l-rr (g - q); t = 2, 3, ••• (9b )
The relation between J and rr is represented graphically in Fig. 1 for
different values of p. As one can see, a small probability rr of detection al-
ways can be balancedby a large J in order to guarantee the postulated p
however, if J is smaller than g.p, even with rr =1 the postulated p cannot
be guaranteed.
3.4 Cost Optimization
The costs as a function of J and kare given by eq. (3):
K= J. (k(b+e.x}+b I .n1+e
o (2+x.n1))
If one replaces k by rr with the help of eq. (1), one obtains
( 10)
(11 )
In order to be able to proceed further one has to discern between the two
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cases ~ < 1 and ~ > 1.
9 g-
Case 1: %< 1
If one replaces in this case J by rr with the help of eq. (6b) one obtains
the total costs K as a function of rr alone:





As rr is a monotonely increasing function of k, the minimum of the costs with
respect to varying k is given at ko' where
{
n2 for -rr1•a1+a2 > 0
k = arbitrary for -rr 1•a1+a2 = 0 (13)0
0 for -rr 1•a1+a2 < 0
As it will be shown in the next sectionin all cases considered one has ko = O.
This leads to the following minimum costs (rr(ko = 0) =rrl):
(~) . = rrL · (b I en1+e' (2+x'n1))9 mln 1 (14)
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Case 2: %~ 1
In this case it is not possible to eHminate J in a stmp'le analytical way
as it could be achieved in case 1. Thus, it is best to start with eq. (11)
which is written in the following form:
(15)
Using the notations (12b) and (12c) one obtains
(16)
For the optimization procedure one has to choose for a given p a certain
value of k .and take from Fig. 1 the.corresponding valueof ~.




(This relation one also obtains for i =0 with the help of the approximation
n
1- n' 2! = (1- II)9
9
which is valid for TI«l.)
In this case one obtains from eq. (16)
The relevant functions
TI
f( n) = - ln(1-II)
g(II) = __1__
ln(l- II)
are presented graphically in Fig. 2a.
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In order to decide which of the two cases, ~ < 1 or ~ > 1, is valid one
9 g-
has to consider the allowed region for rr. From eq. (1) one can takethat
for varying number of controlled birdcages rr varies in the following limits
According to the discussion in the foregoing section one can conclude that
Case I (II) holds if rr1(~}p
Otherwise case I as well as case 11 is possible.
3.5 Numerical Example
The numerical examples considered in this section are summarized in Table 5.
It is to be noted that one must not specify numerical values of the reference
time T and the critical time T as 10ng as one expresses all relevant quantities,
Le. J and K in terms of 9 = T-1 •
T
First, the question is analyzed whether or not one has %<1. The result is shown
in Table 6.
Second, it is analyzed whether or not the quantity
a2A =-rr1 +-a1
is negative for the different values of the parameters n1, n2, b, b
l
, X,e.
The result is shown in Table 7. From this table one can take that A is negative
in all numerical cases considered.
For the case ~ <1 this means according to the relations (13) that it is optimal
for the inspector not to check birdcage seals at all.
For the case ~ >1 this means according to eq. (17) that one has to check
whether or no~ the function
f(rr} + A·g(rr)
decreases with increasing TI. From Fig. 2b one can take that the function in
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all cases considered has its minimum for the smallest n possible, this means
that also in this case it is optimal for the inspector not to check birdcage
seal s at alL
In Table 8 the results of the optimization are collected. In all cases one has
ko = 0; for ~ <1 one obtains from eq. (6b)
(~) ::.E....
9 0 nl
and (~)min is given by eq. (14). For %~l one can take (%)0 from Fig. 1
for n =n1, (~)min is given by eq. (17) for n =nl •
It is to be noted that in the case p =0.9, nl :: 0.8 the result is only ~
approximately true as in this case the approximation used (1- ~ ·n ~(I-n)g)
does not work very welle
Up tonow the optimal numberof birdcage seals to be checked. always was zero.
This must not lead to the conclusion that this is true in any case. If one
takes for example the cost model given byeq. (3 8 ) for b = b'
and takes b = 5 DM (Euratom seals)and c = 3000 DM (four days per visit plus
1000 DM for the evaluation of the seal characteristics in a central laboratory)
one obtains for"1 =3, n2 = 150, nl =0.7,p<nl that the minimum costs are
reached in case all birdcage seals are checked.
3.6 Discussion, Interpretation
Amodel for safeguarding a Plutonium storage has been analyzed; the problem
was to find the optimal combination between number ofinspections J per referen-
ce time and number of seals k to be identified and changed. The result was
that in an numerical cases considered on the basis of the cost model given
by eq. (3) the number of seals to be verified was zero. This can be explained
with the help of the cost relation (12a) for the case %<1: The costs for
identifying and changing the birdcage seals are always higher than the tosts
for travelling and identifying and changing the container seals. Only in case
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the latter costs are higher than the former the result would be different.
The same argument holds for the case %~1.
In the case ~ <1 (i.e. for TI 1>P according to section 3.3) and under the
assumption that the optimal numberof birdcage seals to be verified is zer~
one obtains the following relation between probability of detection p, number
of inspections J per reference time T, critical time T and probability for
the identification of a falsified seal TI l :
(18)
This relation can be interpreted in the following way:
For a postulated probability of detection p with respect to the reference
time T, a critical time T and a quality of the seals expressed by TI 1,
the necessary number of inspections per year is J, given by eq. (18).
However, under the circumstances given the critical time is not known and fur-
thermore, the budget is given which detenmines the number of inspections per
reference time in the framework of this model. Under these circumstances one
'may interprete relat~on (18) in the following alternative way:
If the inspection authority fixes a certain value for the probability
of detection with respect to a reference time and furthermore, the
number of inspections per year as well as the quality of the seals then
the inspection authority behaves as ifthe critical time has a value given
by relation (18).
This interpretation may be used to judge which type amongst a number of types
of seals available, differing in quality and costs, should be used for safe-
guards purposes: If one considers a specific type of seals the costs per seal
and the quality nl are given therefore, for a given budget for the reference
time T the number of inspections J is given. For a fixed probability of detec-
tion thus, one obtains a critical time in the sense discussed above. As a
result of this consideration one should use that type of seals which leads to
the shortest critical time (pessimistic behaviour).
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4. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper an attempt has been made toquantify the relevant characteristics
of containment measures in a similar manner used for material accountancy
me(isures. It is shown that the parameters:assumed degree of falsification,
probabi lity of detection, average detection time and safeguards costscan
be set into relation with each other. Two game theoretical models have been
considered to illustrate the quantification and optimization procedures.
In the case of a sealed Plutonium storage, it appears that such quantification
is possible if sealed barriers are assumed to be present in stages, e.g.
first a sealed container and then a number of sealed birdcages inside the
container. In such a system, the storage operator if he plans a diversion,
has to falsify the seals in a sequential manner.
The ideaof critical time particular in the case of a sealed storage has to
be introduced for the quantification of the concept of Itimely detection l ,
accepted as apart of the objective of international safeguards. In the
context of the quantification of the characteristics of sealing measures,
the critical time means the time required to falsify the sealingsystem in
addition to the time required to convert nuclear material into a nuclear
explosive device after the diversion. The frequency of inspections which
determines theaverage detection time; should be putinto relatic:m to the
.. critical time, unless additional containment or survei1lancemeasures are
introduced toensure that the material remains unaccessible for diversion
in the intervals between two inspections.
In a large number of cases investigated in the paper for the sealed storage,
the optimum strategy of inspections has been found to consist of checking
only the container seals and not checking the birdcage seals at all. This
corresponds to the basic philosophy that more frequent and superficial in-
spections are more effective than less frequent and thorough inspections.
For sealed storages with Plutonium, frequent inspection visits may not be
hampering. However, such basic trends have been found to be dependent on
the assumptions made for the model and cost structure assumed.
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It appears useful to devote further effort in this area of quantification
with particular attention to the possibility of establishing inherent
relations between the critical and detection times. The measurement un-
certainties, process variations and the inspection sampling procedures give
information on the amount of diversion which a safeguards system is capable
of detecting. The frequenc;es of inspection and physical inventory takings,
on the other hand, give information on the capability of a safeguards orga-
nization for a timely detection. Since the latter actions may be often man-
power intensive and intrusive, a proper utilization of containment measures
may lead to less intrusive and intensive activities related to safeguards.
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Table 1: Strategies of the Operators and the Inspector in the
Shi pper-Recei ver-Si tuati on
(A: Shipper Station resp. Shipper; B: Receiver Station resp.
Receiver; from the point of time t 1 on Receiver is responsible
for the materi al )
Strategies of the Inspector:
1. Checking of the operatoris data at A
2. Sealing of the bottles at A after operator's measurements at A,
identification of seals at B before operator's measurements
3. Checking of the operatoris data at B
Strategies of the Operators:
2.41.4
No Diversion Cooperation 'Diversion Cooperation
between A and B between A and B
Falsification of
data at A 1.1 I 2.1
Diversion after
measurement at A,
before \ 1.2 2.2
Diversion after tt'
before measuremen
at B 1.3 2.3
Falsification of data
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Table 2: Payoff Matrix for Single Inspection and Single Diversion
Strategies
(Pc(M»: probability of detection; T : critical time
\Operators
\ No Diversion Cooperation Diversion Cooperation,
Inspector\ 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
1 (_l;r)l) (-l,T) (-1,T2) (-1,0)2) (-Pc(M) ,0) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
(-Pc(M),O)
2 (-l;r) (-l,T) (-1,T2) (-1,0) (0,00) (-I,T (-1,T2) (0,00)
I (-1,0)
(0,00)4) I(-Pc(M) .0)I 3 1(-l,T) r(-I,T) (-1,T2) (-Pc(M) ,0) (0,00) (0,00)
! II
l)If the inspector would check no measurements at all, the operator B would state
after the time T that operator A had falsified data. If the inspector checks
the measurements at A he will state at onte - dependent of his effort C - with
a certain probability PM(C) that the data reported are falsified.
2)With the help of a comparison of the reported data of the operators A and B the
inspector will detect at once that the data are falsified.
3)It is assumed here that operator B knows that the inspector checksonlythe
measurements at A. Thus, all the falsifications will be doneat B.(In case
the inspector would check measurements at A and B, one could irnagine that a
distribution of the falsifications to the places A and B would be better from
the side of the operators.)
4)It is assumed that the operator A knows that the inspector checks only the
measurements at B. Thus, all the falsifications will be done at A.
-1
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Table 3: Payoff matrix for Composed Inspection and Single Diversion
Strategies in Case of Diversion Cooperation of the Operators
2.1 2.2 2.4
1+3 (-Pc(M),O) (-PC(M),T) (-Pc(M),O)
,...,
1+2+3 (-Pc(M},O) "-J(-1,T) (-Pc(M),O)
-Table 4a: Reduced P-Game (Pc(M) > Pc{M))






Table 5: Numerical Values for the Parameters of the Plutonium
Storage Safeguards Model
( nr ) C:o ); (1::0 )n2
p 0.8 ; 0.2
TI r 0.5 . 0.9,
[mandays] rx j()
( :.) [DM] U~ ) ( 20 '; 200)[DM]
e [DM] 400
Table 6: Analysis of Cases I and 11
~ 0.5 0.9
0.2
I J i!. > 1> 1
0.2 < TI < 0.36 9 9-
0.8
J J > 1- <1 - « )0.8 < TI < 0.96 9 9- -
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-0.171 0.2 -0.194 0.2
-0.771
for TI 1 = 0.8 -0.794
for TI 1 = 0.8
20 -0.154 0.2 -0.177 0.2
(200)
-0.754
for TI I = 0.8 -0.777
for TI I = 0.8
Table 8: Results of Optimization: Optimal Number of Inspections
(~g) per Reference Time and Minimum Costs (~) .
o :1 mln
I p = 0.5 P = 0.9
TI = 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8
J 0.62 10.327 1.63(9) = 3.1
. 0
b 20 2820.1 562.5 9371. 3 1310.4(bI) = (20)
(nI) =n2
3 20 4482.4 900 14895.0 2070.1(150) (200)
(~g) 5846.6 1124.9 19428.3 2825.2
30
1500) 20








o o 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
--'=>~ Tt
1.0
Fig.l Graphical representation of the relation
1- p = (1 - Tt) g (1 - Tt . .:n.. )j
9
.1. =~ + .:!l.. i ~ integer i 0 ~ l ~ 1













Fig.2a Graphical representation of the functions











Fig.2b Graphical representation of the function
HTt} + A· g( Tt) for Tt1 = 0.2 and
(i) 1\1 =3 1\r150 b=20 b'=200 (A=-0.154)
Ui )1\ 1 .::30 1\? =1500 b = 20 b'=20 ( A =- 0.194 )
